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Above all, with respect to animals one can observe
a tendency to argue in a way similar to some arguments
concerning environmental problems: as measures
responding to the depletion of the ozone layer, the
greenhouse effect, or increased incidence of leukemia
near nuclear power plants are prevented by saying that
the causes of these phenomena have not yet been proved
sufficiently, necessary measures in favor of animals
are similarly prevented by saying that the existence
and extent of animal suffering have not yet been
sufficiently established.
This being so, the question whether animals have
inner life (and to what extent) appears after all to be a
question worth dealing with concretely and explicitly.
Hence in the following I shall inquire into the question
whether animals have conscious, subjective psychological experiences. In short: are animals conscious?
The question, whether animals are conscious, is at
bottom hypocritical and superfluous. It is hypocritical,
because a large part of what we know concerning the
human mind comes from investigations into animals
minds: animal research forms a substantial basis of
human psychology. Considering this fact and
considering the further fact that in the setting of
psychology this has been accomplished by the cruelest
animal research, it is highly cynical to ask about animal
consciousness. On the other hand, the question of
animal consciousness is superfluous, because to

The question, whether animals have souls, is ambiguous. It can have a religious or a psychological meaning:
• Do animals have (immortal) souls?
• Do animals have inner life, i.e., do animals have
subjective psychological experiences?
At first I was not very happy with these alternatives,
because both questions seemed unpromising for several
reasons. I just want to mention two of these reasons:
• Whether animals have immortal souls is as
incapable of proof as is the existence of God;
• That animals do have inner life seems to be a
rather obvious assertion.
Upon reflection, though, the second, psychological
question doesn't seem so unimportant to me after all.
Though today no one would be likely to defend the
Cartesian position that animals are insensible robots
explicitly, this attitude nevertheless still operates
implicitly and subconsciously.
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everyone who is not completely crazy, it is already clear
that animals also have psychological experience.

o

emotions as we are is so well established, that it will
not be necessary to weary the reader by many details."
(p. 84) After giving examples of love, jealousy,
ambition, pride, modesty, rage, and even of animals'
sense of humor (p. 86f), he turns to "the more
intellectual emotions and faculties" and describes
wonder, curiosity, imitation, attentiveness, memory, and
understanding of animals. (pp.87-92)1
Without wishing to go into details, one should point
to the biological foundation of the psychological
similarity between humans and animals (cf. Rollin,
1981, p. 41):

The fact that our fellow humans are similar,
and feel similarly, to us, is evident in exactly
the same sense as mathematical axioms are
evident. We are not able not to believe in them.
Karl Buhler, who to my knowledge was the
first to call attention to these facts, spoke of
"you-evidence."
We have the same axiomatic certainty for
animals' souls, as we have for supposing in our
fellow humans the existence of a soul (which
means the ability to experience subjectively).
A human who truly knows a higher mammal,
perhaps a dog or a monkey, and will not be
satisfied that these beings experience similarly
to himself, is psychologically abnonnal and
belongs in a psychiatric clinic, as an impaired
capacity for "you-evidence" makes him a public
enemy. (Lorenz, 1980, pp. 251,254)

We know with certainty for humans that
emotional processes occur in essence in the
brain stem and in the limbic system. This,
however, is as highly developed in higher
mammals as in humans....
Although the anatomy of bird brains is not
directly similar to that of mammal brains, it
would be very inept not to ascribe intensive
mental experiences also to birds. (Lorenz,
1980, p. 254)

Animal consciousness was already given voice to
by David Hume (1739, quoted in Griffin, 1984, p. 2),
who thought it a foregone conclusion: "No truth appears
more evident, than that beasts are endow'd with thought
and reason as well as men." Also according to Robert
Spaemann (1984, p.7l) it is well-known "that at least
more highly evolved animals can experience conditions
which we can describe accurately only with words like
pain, suffering, pleasure and well-being." And Adolph
Portmann (1987, pp. 112, 116), for whom there can be
no doubt that animals have a rich conscious life, poses
the question:

Finally, it should be remembered that the psychological similarity between humans and animals also
follows from considerations from evolutionary theory:
humans and animals are related; the differences between
them are not so much a matter ofkind as they are instead
a matter of degree, so that "the senses and intuitions,
the various faculties ... of which man boasts, may be
found in incipient, or even sometimes in a welldeveloped condition, in the lower animals." (Darwin,
1874, p. 141; cf. Portmann, 1987, esp. pp. 110ff., 116)
In connection with evolutionary theory, a personal
observation: those who most vehemently claim an
insuperable gulf between themselves and animals, are
in truth the closest to being "animals"!

May one truly ask in earnest, whether animals
have a soul-is the answer not obvious-is it
not self evident for everyone whose heart is
open to animals, that these creatures are
ensouled, that they perceive and experience
similarly as we do, that they are subject to
moods as we are, that they exhibit attachment
and rejection among themselves, as in
intimacy with us humans?" (p. 108)

Pain
Pain is that psychological phenomenon which is
most manifestly experienced by both humans and
animals, for at least two reasons. The first is animals'
behavior in situations which cause pain to humans. This
behavior allows no doubt that they also experience pain.
The second reason is that pain has a biological function
of protecting from danger: "No higher creatures without
pain-but without pain also no higher life: pain is that

Also for Charles Darwin (1874) there can be no
doubt that between humans and higher mammals there
is no fundamental difference regarding inner life (ch. 3):
"The fact that the lower animals are excited by the same
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a higher degree of pain. It is correct that the
relation to pain changes, but false that pain
in principle increases. The ability to reflect
also allows us to foresee an end of pain, oras in the case of a painful cure-to recognize
its necessity, which allows us to endure more
easily. Beyond this, only humans can ask
themselves the question of the sense of life,
leading to despair over an apparently
meaningless life, but also being able to
accept one's life and digesting it creatively.
In a word: however much the relation to pain
changes with the capacity for reflection, this
provides no argument for having less regard
for the pain of subhuman creatures than for
the pain of humans.

warning which protects our bodies and lives." (Frey,
1978, p. 7) (cf. also Serjeant, 1970, p. 56-62) On that
score, it is important to establish that by no means do
animals feel pain to a lesser degree than humans do.
Rather consider:
All known/acts support the assertion that the
higher mammals experience pain at least as
strongly as we do. It is nonsensical to say that
they experience it less because they are lower
animals. One can easily show that the senses
of animals are much sharper than ours. Birds
often see better, nearly all free living animals
hear better, others have a more sensitive sense
of touch than we do. The sharp perception of
a hostile environment is of more vital
importance for higher animals that it is for
contemporary humans. Apart from the
complicated cortex which does not perceive
pain directly, the nervous systems ofthe higher
animals are nearly identical with ours.
(Serjeant, 1970, p. 99ff. emphasis added)

As evident and certain as is the capacity to
experience pain among the higher animals, so it is
probable, on the other hand, that the further we descend
on the evolutionary scale, we end finally somewhere in
reflexive, mechanical reactions. We will not here
discuss the problem of line-drawing, which is much
more a theoretical than a practical concern, but will later
discuss it. Mention should be made in this connection
of the very serious clues that worms and insects are
also clearly capable of pain. (see Rollin, 1981, p. 3lff.;
Lockwood, 1988: and Griffin, 1984, pp. 179-195).

Next to the above mentioned physiological aspects
there are, however, also still psychological grounds which
suggest that in certain circumstances animals feel pain
even more intensely than humans. Bernard Rollin (1981,
p. 33) points out the possibility that animals in pain
experience only pain, without the possibility of
anticipating an end to the pain, so that their entire
psychological horizon is filled with pain. And Bernhard
Grzimek (quoted in Teutsch, 1987, p. 264) writes in
reference to animals: "Their pains are much more horrible
than ours, for they must suffer them blind and dumb, they
know not why or what for. They have no comfort." Also
RobertSpaemann (1979, quoted in Teutsch, 1987, p. 264)
has himself stated about this issue: "On the one hand,
reason can increase pain because it accumulates past and
future pain, so to speak. On the other hand, however,
reason gives us the ability to dissociate from and overcome
pain. To sing psalms on the way into the gas chambersthat no animal can do. They are delivered speechless, in
dumb fear, and their fear is nearly always fear of death."
Otfried Hoffe (1984, p. 85ff., quoted in Teutsch, 1987,
p. 264) has also attended to the details of this issue:

Suffering
However, animals experience not only physical
pain, but also psychological suffering: the pain of
separation, homesickness, grief, despair, hopelessness,
dread, anger. (Bilz, 1974, V, 28; Serjeant, 1970, p.
100) That animals also suffer mentally is not just the
personal opinion or invention of sentimental animal
lovers, but an indisputable reality. The best evidence
of this is that professional animal exploiters who work
solely for the "optimal" exploitation of food animals
confirm it. So, for example, M. Cena (1978) in his
contribution to an anthology on "Farm Animal
Production," speaks explicitly of depression, neuroses,
psychoses, nervousness, and stress of animals.
What has already been mentioned in reference to
physical pain must also be pointed out with respect to
psychological suffering, that under certain circumstances animals will suffer more than similarly situated
humans. For example, if humans are captured in war,

Now one could object that the distinguishing
feature of humans and animals, the ability to
reflect, entails a new relation to pain, especially
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legged hooligan wanted the daintiest morsel,
always appearing first at the food place.
One day, however, he had wasted time, and
as he sprang out of the water, all the adults
and older beavers were already pressing at the
trough. He ran back to the river and hastily
slapped the water three times with his wide
tail. In beaver language that is the alarm signal
for the highest danger. In a flash all the other
beavers vanished, and the young rascal had
the food all to himself...
Consider what pertains to the performance
of this little beaver: he had to give the alarm
and fright signal, without having a real fright
of a predator. Hence he had to free himself
from the chains of instinctive behavior and act
intentionally. He succeeded only through an
act of self-reflection: he had to know how his
act would affect others to deceive them.

we can explain to them that they will be searched and
locked up, but that in the meantime nothing else will
happen to them and that they will be freed later. But if
we capture a wild animal, we cannot communicate to it
that we will not kill it. It cannot distinguish between
an attempt to overcome it and an attempt to kill it, and
thus much the same fright is produced in both situations.
(Singer, 1984, p. 76, and 1982, p. 36) Also, Robert
Spaemann (1984, p. 78) has stated: "Just because
animals cannot integrate their suffering into a higher
identity of an intentional life connection, and so master
it, they are delivered to their suffering. They are, so to
speak, in pain, only pain, before all, if they cannot react
through flight or aggression."

Intelligence
Following the previous theoretical explanations of
animal consciousness, we will now tum our attention
to some examples of animal behavior. Although these
examples are not a proof in the strongest sense of the
existence of animal consciousness-such a proof is
not possible even in the case of the existence of
consciousness in our fellow humans; we will return to
this topic later-nevertheless (especially in connection
with theoretical considerations) they make animal
consciousness so plausible and probable that serious
doubts are not possible. We tum next to examples of
animal intelligence.

Concerning a rhesus monkey in New York's Bronx Zoo,
Droscher reports:
One day a shrewd fellow was missing from
the large monkey rock, and it took a few days
before someone found and captured him. The
enclosure, the moat, and everything else was
examined. Nowhere was a possible escape
route discovered. But the next day the deserter
was gone again.
Once again, a police contingent set about
trapping the animal. And then a keeper laid in
wait to discover the monkey's secret escape
path. At daybreak he finally saw the animal
take a banana from a hiding place. This
charitable visitor's gift had been reserved
especially for his escape plan. He ran with it
to the broad moat, which bordered the moose
enclosure, and swung the banana visibly back
and forth-just like a scientist, who wished to
artfully lure some experimental animal with a
food reward.
In fact, a large moose swam over to the
rhesus monkey. Quickly putting the banana in
his mouth as a ticket, so to speak, the cunning
and water-shy fellow sprang onto the moose's
broad back and allowed the "boat" to ferry him
to the neighboring enclosure. From here the
escape was only monkey-child's play. (p. l00ff.)

Darwin (1874, p. 85) reports the following occurrence:
At the Cape of Good Hope an officer had often
plagued a certain baboon, and the animal
seeing him approaching one Sunday for
parade, poured water into a hole and hastily
made some thick mud, which he skillfully
dashed over the officer as he passed by, to the
amusement of many bystanders. For long
afterward the baboon rejoiced and triumphed
whenever he saw his victim.
Vitus Droscher (1987b) reports the following
"performance":
A young Canadian beaver performed a real
prank. Each morning at the same time with
its parents, relatives and older siblings it would
forage from a farmer's wife. There the four-
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Finally, a story which Droscher reports concerning
baboons:

will stay as near as possible to the children, to sing to
them. The tuna fish industry takes note of this only
insofar as it has noted that the majority of dolphins found
in their nets are female or young. In this way, about
150,000 come to die each year. (O'Barry, 1989, p.18ff.)
Also in the social life of animals we find types of
behavior which it would be absurd not to accept as
connected with subjective experience. The basis for
animal social life, as with humans, is the ability to give
love, the desire to receive love, and the suffering which
results from deprivation of loved ones. (See Robbins,
1987, pp. 37-39)
The most impressive proof of animal social life
occurring on the level of subjective experience is
doubtless the emotional relation between mother and
children. Disturbing or preventing these relations
leads, as in humans, to severe, lifelong harm, even
literally to insanity. One can in no way doubt this
conclusion, which grew out of decades of intensive
scientific research. The dreadful experiments on
monkeys which the American psychologist Harry
Harlow carried out are only the best known in this
area of research, in which animals are systematically
and intentionally caused the most severe mental
suffering, in order to achieve new scientific knowledge
concerning humans. Thus Harlow and his colleague
Stephen Suomi describe

In a free enclosure of a zoo the strongest male
ascended to sultan, and forbade the rest of the
males to have intimate relations with his
"ladies." He endured not even the slightest
flirt. Still, he couldn't always stand guard. If
he removed anywhere to the shadows of the
rock to nap, it could happen that the ladies
would two-time with other males. A harem
female who had been neglected by the sultan
for a long time, began in such an opportunity
to openly display all her charms in order to
befriend a bachelor.
At just that moment the sultan reappeared,
and something incredible happened: as if
threatened with murder, the cheater cried out,
scrambled loose, gave the still courting male
a slap, moaning loudly fled into the arms of
the bewildered sultan, and complained to him,
looking across at her seducer raging loudly and
angrily with her arms beating the ground. And
she achieved her goal: the sultan, who for
forbidden intimacy usually only punished the
female, believed this crafty lie. First he
thrashed the blameless bachelor suitably, and
then he overwhelmed the "certified sufferer"
with affection. (p. lOlff.)2

how they had the "fascinating idea" of
inducing depression by "allowing baby
monkeys to attach to cloth surrogate mothers
who could become monsters":
"The first of these monsters was a cloth
monkey mother who, upon schedule or demand,
would eject high-pressure compressed air. It
would blow the animal's skin practically off its
body. What did the baby monkey do? It simply
clung tighter and tighter to the mother, because
a frightened infant clings to its mother at all
costs. We did not achieve any psychopathology.
"However, we did not give up. We built
another surrogate monster mother that would
rock so violently that the baby's head and teeth
would rattle. All the baby did was cling tighter
and tighter to the surrogate. The third monster
we built had an embedded wire frame within
its body which would spring forward and
eject the infant from its ventral surface. The
infant would subsequently pick itself off the

Social Life
All higher animals demonstrate individuality
in behavior, choice, aversion, and preference
within social life. In mates which come
together to reproduce we see very intimate
relations, which are preserved beyond all
sexual necessity, and similar relations can be
observed between animal parents and their
children. All zoos know how the welfare of
their wards depends on the effectiveness of
such relations. (portmann, 1987, p. 115)
Concerning the mother-child relation among
dolphins, John Robbins (1987, p. 39) reports the
following: if dolphin children fall into tuna nets, their
mother will follow them for endless stretches, trying to
accompany the children as far as possible. If mother
and child are caught together in the nets, the mother
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attacked by three sharks. Immediately, he
burst forth with a series of shrill whistles: SOS
signals in dolphin language. The short doublenotes sound like an over-wound alarm siren:
the first part increases sharply in musical pitch,
the second falls as harshly.
The result was amazing. The group of
dolphins (approximately 20), chatting with
whistling, screaming, grunting, gurgling,
growling and squeaking sounds, immediately
stopped their conversation. As in an
emergency call in shipping, there was
absolute radio silence. Then the animals shot
in greatest haste at 60 krn/hr to the area of
the surprise attack. The male dolphins
rammed the sharks with undiminished speed.
They dealt crashing blows to their sides until
the sharks were crushed and sank to the deep
bottom of the Caribbean Sea with broken
bones and cartilage.
During the struggle, the females endeavored
to help the disabled adolescent dolphin, who
could no longer surface on his own strength.
Two took him between them, pushing him
under his vertical fins and holding him so high
that the blow hole on his head projected out of
the water and the disabled one could breathe
again. By reciprocal whistling signals the
helping maneuver was accomplished exactly.
From time to time they would relieve the
stretcher bearers. Once it was observed how
this indefatigable rescue work went on
continuously day and night for a full two weeks,
until the injured dolphin was healthy and back
to his original strength. (p.95ff.)

floor, wait for the frame to return into the
cloth body, and then cling again to the
surrogate. Finally, we built our porcupine
mother. On command, this mother would
eject sharp brass spikes over all of the ventral
surface of its body. Although the infants were
distressed by these pointed rebuffs, they
simply waited until the spikes receded and
then returned and clung to the mother."
These results, the experimenters remark,
.were not so surprising, since the only recourse
of an injured child is to cling to its mother.
Eventually, Harlow and Suomi gave up on
the artificial monster mothers because they
found something better: a real monkey
mother that was a monster. To produce such
mothers, they reared female monkeys in
isolation, and then tried to make them
pregnant. Unfortunately, the females did not
have normal sexual relations with male
monkeys, so they had to be made pregnant
by a technique which Harlow and Suomi refer
to as a "rape rack." When the babies were
born the researchers observed the monkeys.
They found that some simply ignored the
infants, failing to cuddle the crying baby to
the breast as normal monkeys do when they
hear their baby cry. The other pattern of
behavior observed was different:
"The other monkeys were brutal or lethal.
One of their favorite tricks was to crush the
infant's skull with their teeth. But the really
sickening behavior pattern was that of
smashing the infant's face to the floor, then
rubbing it back and forth." (Singer, 1975, pp.
44-45. Quotations are from Engineering and
Science, 33, 6 (April, 1970), p. 8)

A chimpanzee was seriously wounded by a
hunting party and plunged to the ground. As
he thereupon let out a cry for help, the other
members of the troop surrounded him, raised
him up, propping him in an unbelievable
human manner, and urged him with gentle
sounds to go with them. While this was
occurring, a strong ape threw himself,
screeching loudly, between the sick transport
and the hunters. Only when he heard through
repeated shouts from his companions that they
had found protection in a thick wood, he
removed himself to safety. (p. 96)

Morally Analogous Behavior
A further proof of animal consciousness, one which
is most closely connected to social life and overlaps
with it, is so-called morally analogous behavior. The
following examples, in my opinion, speak for
themselves. The next three reports come from Droscher
(1987a):
In the ocean area of the Lesser Antilles, an
adolescent dolphin strayed far beyond the
visual range of his troop, and was suddenly
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Especially astonishing is the fact that
chimpanzees do not manifest solidarity only
with their own kind. As a Dutch researcher
tied a chick in the path of a virgin forest, the
robust chimpanzees also freed this chirper,
gracefully removing the chain, and being
certain not to injure the delicate legs of the
small bird. (p. 97)

Three Objections

By now it should be clear to everyone that animals
are not unconscious automata, but feeling creatures
with conscious psychological experience; may I
conclude by considering three objections which are
frequently produced in this area:

"There is no clear demarcation between conscious
and unconscious creatures:'

James Rachels (1976, p. 215ff.) tells of a diabolical
experiment that was conducted in the United States
with rhesus monkeys. The details of the experiment
should not be gone into here. It is enough to briefly
represent the basic conception and the results of the
experiment. Two animals would be placed in an
experimental device, with a glass wall separating them
in the middle. The animal on one side had the
possibility of obtaining food by operating a lever. The
floor of the section on the other side, where the second
animal was, could be delivered a current, which would
give this animal a strong and very painful electric
shock. Now the experiment was set up in such a way
that, every time the first animal pressed the food lever,
the second animal would receive a strong electric
shock. In this manner it could be established whether
and to what degree the first animal would renounce
food in order to spare its conspecific an electric shock.
It appeared that a distinct majority of experimental
animals placed in the compartment with the food lever
preferred to go without food for days rather than to
deliver an electric shock to the animal present on the
other side.
E. Gavin Reeve (1978, p. 562) reports a mongrel,
Blackie, who had tried in vain to rescue Ian, a fourmonth infant, from a burning house. Both perished
in the flames. Although no one observed the dog's
brave rescue aUempt direclly, clear traces were left
behind: light impressions of his teeth on the baby's
shoulder, from when he was trying to pull Ian from
the fire.
The fire broke out in the kitchen. While the mother
hastened to her two other children, B1ackie ran into
Ian's bedroom. The mother heard a bump which
probably was the striking of the child, as the dog pulled
him from his bed onto the floor. The dead child was
found only a few centimeters from Blackie's
outstretched paws. The dog had come to the family
first a year previous. After the birth of Ian, he sat
most frequently next to the child's bed.

Between the Species

This objection is just as correct as it is unimportant.
Such questions of line drawing arise everywhere in
life, without creating serious uncertainty in our
decisions. Between warm and cold, poor and rich,
right and wrong there is also no clear, unequivocal
boundary. Nevertheless, that there is no unquestioned
line to be drawn for these conceptions gives us no great
difficulty as a rule. We know what is meant by talk of
warm food, rich people or wrongful activity.
And so it is also concerning the question which
creatures have psychological experience: no reasonable
person would wish to seriously maintain that dogs, cats,
apes, pigs, cows, and chickens (and all other animals
concerning which the well known animal protection
questions are asked) do not suffer if we poison, gas,
burn them, place them in lifelong captivity, or brutally
kill them. And the decisive point in connection with
our question is not that it is uncertain where the
boundary between conscious and unconscious creatures
exaclly lies, but that it is certain that it does not lie
between humans and animals.

"We have no access to animal consciousness.
because animals cannot speak."
Obviously, language is of enormous importance in
human life. And it would be absurd to put into question
the towering role that language has for the entirety of
human evolution and culture. However, in concrete
interpersonal communication, verbal language is
neither the sole, nor always the best, way of
communicating. And therefore the impossibility of
speaking with animals is no fundamental hindrance
to access to animal experience. Bernard Rollin (1983,
p. 111, and 1981, pp. 36ff., 55, 57) calls attention in
this connection to the following facts:
In a certain sense animal psychic life is even more
easily accessed than is that of other humans, because
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solipsism-the view that I am the only conscious.
thinking creature." (Griffin, 1984. p.39)
We can have ultimate certainty concerning neither
animal experience nor the experience of other humans.
In both cases we are directed to probabilistic and
analogical arguments. Referring to this, there are no
relevant differences of principle between the problems
and the possibilities of grasping animal experience, and
the problems and possibilities of grasping human
experience. We must in both cases use the same
epistemological and methodological measures, and
must not demand in regard to grasping animal
experience a logical and methodological standard which
in the case of humans is neither attainable nor expected
(cf. Teutsch, 1987, p. 14; Sambraus, 1982. pp. 24-27;
Lorenz, 1980, p. 251; Griffin, 1984. p. 38ff.):

it is more simply structured. While human needs are
determined socially, culturally, and historically, and
therefore correspondingly variable in form, animal
needs are simpler and more stable. Due to the simpler
structure of animal psyche, there are also fewer sources
and possibilities of deception. Nonverbal animal
behavior is often a more reliable indicator of
experience and desires than human speech is; animal
lies are very infrequent.
Also, an important part of human communication
takes place on a nonverbal level. All lovers know that
in the critical and decisive moments linguistic
communication breaks down and feelings and moods
are best brought to expression through a glance, a
gesture, or a touch. And the earliest and most important
human communication succeeds long before we can
speak: namely, in the empathetic relation between
mother and child. Here in a subtle and complex manner
psychic experience is communicated, without the child
being able to use a single word. This early, perfcctly
functioning mother-child relation is the best and most
impressive proof that communicative and cognitive
equivalence of two creatures is not a presupposition of
functioning communication between them.
'The existence of animal consciousness cannot be
scient(fically established."

Many of the objections to the exploration of
thought and feelings of animals ... seem to be
based on a kind of species solipsism. It may
be logically impossible to refute the assertion
that all animals are thoughtless robots. But
we can escape this paralyzing dilemma. if we
rely on the same criteria of reasonable
plausibility by which we acknowledge the
consciousness of other humans. (Griffin,
1984,p.39)

This objection is correct. But it holds not only
for animal consciousness, but for all consciousness
outside our own, which means it holds also for the
consciousness of other humans. Their subjective
experience is not objective or provable either,
because our knowledge of the experience of others
is necessarily always based on an analogical
argument (which is certainly very probable, but never
can conduct us to absolutely certain conclusions):
because our fellow humans are obviously similar to
us, and because they react similarly to us in similar
situations, we reasonably conclude that they also
experience similarly to us. However, ultimately, all
subjective experience is bound to the subject, and
we have no possibility of direct access to this
experience. Logically, all other humans could be
completely spiritless, thoughtless, and unconscious
robots acting from complicated computer programs
and a complex mechanism, which only impart the
appearance of being humans with conscious
psychological experience. "Pure logic cannot refute

That animals have consciousness is as certain as it
is certain that other humans have consciousness. And
whether animals have immortal souls is as uncertain
as it is uncertain whether humans have immortal souls.
The question whether animals have immortal souls
is, however, not only factually uncertain, but also
morally unimportant. In any case, no support can be
found for the assumption that, should animals lack
immortal souls, we may therefore treat them worse.
(See Regan, 1987, p. 69; cr. Rollin, 1981, p. 6ff, as
well as 1983, p. 107).
How long a creature lives is unimportant for the
question how we should treat it while it lives. If a dog
has been hit by an auto and we can mitigate its pain.
then we should do so. It would be grotesque to say:
"We need not help him. as he will not live forever
anyway." It is no less grotesque to say that we have
no moral obligations to animals, because they have
no life after death. If from this fact anything follows.
then it is exactly the opposite: if animals only have
this life, then we should do everything possible to
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the moral status of animals. That animals do have souls
in the psychological sense we know, and whether they
have souls in the religious sense is-at best-irrelevant.
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barefoot, pregnant
and soon to be in the kitchen
of your captor
you stand confined,
designed
to sustain your jailor
with your precious milk
and meaty flesh
for you,
sunshine is a hint of light
through the crack
above your head,
wind is but a noise
against the walls
that surround you
the only bee that stings
is the syringe
that shoots chemical nectar
through your veins
to sweeten your price at market
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when your body is tired
and can produce no more
you will die
at the mercy of those
you have served so well
never knowing that the grass
was greener
along the horizon
Katherine Minott
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